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This paper argues that the “Economics of Crime” concentrates too much on punishment as a means 
of preventing crime, which is unwise for several reasons. There are important instances in which 
punishment simply cannot reduce crime. Several feasible alternatives to punishment exist, such 
as offering positive incentives or handing out awards for law abiding behavior. These alternative 
approaches tend to create a positive sum environment. When people appreciate living in a society 
that is to a large extent law abiding, they are more motivated to observe the law.
1. Punishment’s prominent role
When Gary Becker in his 1968 article founded the 
modern “Economics of Crime,” he called it “Crime 
and Punishment” (Becker, 1968). The basic idea is that 
rational individuals systematically respond to changes 
in relative prices: the higher the expected punishment, 
the lower the crime rate, cet. par. This is an important 
insight because under many conditions the only fea-
sible and effective possibility of fighting criminal be-
havior is indeed to punish the offenders.1 In all societ-
ies throughout the years, punishment has been widely, 
if not exclusively, used as a means of deterring people 
from committing criminal acts. An important issue 
has been the identification of causality; that is, harsh 
punishment tends to reduce crime; however, when 
crime is high, there is a tendency to increase punish-
ment (see: Ehrlich and Brower, 1987; Levitt, 1996, 
1997; and Donohue and Levitt, 2001). The causality 
issue has been approached by using laboratory experi-
ments (e.g., DeAngelo and Charness, 2009). Recently, 
ingenious natural experiments have been used to deal 
with the causality problem; for example, 7, Galbaiati, 
and Vertova (2009) found a robust deterrent effect of 
punishment on crime for individual data.
The Economics of Crime distinguishes two effects 
of punishment. The first is the deterrence effect of im-
posing costs on criminals who are apprehended, and 
the second is the incapacitation effect, which suggests 
that criminals thrown into prison are no longer able to 
pursue their illegal activities. Prison sentences are, of 
course, not the only punishment possible. A less severe 
punishment is probation, which has been shown to 
have mixed effects on recidivism (Engel et al., 2009).
The Economics of Crime has been extended in vari-
ous ways. It suffices to mention three particularly in-
teresting aspects:
1. The concept of punishment has been generalized to 
include the psychic costs to offenders by shaming 
them. Persons committing criminal acts are actively 
revealed to the general populace. As a result, their 
reputation is diminished, thus making it more costly 
for them to be accepted as (trading) partners by oth-
er people because of an innate distrust of criminals. 
A somewhat different type of shaming consists of 
directly confronting the perpetrators with their vic-
tims, thereby imposing psychic costs (Braithwaite, 
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1989; Brennan and Pettit, 2004). The murderer of 
a family’s father, for example, is forced to experience 
the immense loss suffered by the widow and children 
of his victim.2 A related approach is the stigmatiza-
tion of offenders, which works through a reduction 
of wages offered by employers (Funk, 2004).
2. Punishment to some extent is effective even if it is 
not enforced. Punishment serves as a signal to in-
dicate what behavior is considered undesirable by 
lawmakers. Such expressive punishment may be the 
only possible action when it is impossible to moni-
tor and impose punishment, except at an unrea-
sonably high cost.3 An example is the widespread 
custom of spitting in public places - a behavior that 
used to be common in Western countries until the 
middle of the 20th century and which is still com-
mon in many Asian countries. A similar activity is 
littering (Torgler, Frey, and Wilson, 2009).
3. A third extension of the Economics of Crime is the 
so-called broken window theory.4 The idea is that 
unlawful behavior should not be tolerated. One in-
terpretation of this theory is that even perpetrators 
of minor misdemeanors must be immediately and 
severely punished in order to effectively deter people 
from deviating from the law. A similar approach is 
the three-strikes-out concept, which supports life 
imprisonment even for minor criminal acts if the of-
fender repeats the act more than twice.5 The problem 
is that such an approach tends to violate the prin-
ciple of marginal deterrence. If this condition is not 
met, a potential criminal has an incentive to commit 
a worse crime because the expected marginal benefits 
to the offender are likely to be positive while the mar-
ginal punishment remains constant. This insight is 
obvious to economists, but has often been ignored in 
practice. In particular, authoritarian governments and 
dictatorships often seek to deter crime by imposing 
very harsh punishments for even minor crimes. The 
predictable result is that the incidence of crime is low, 
but once a crime is committed it tends to be signifi-
cant. The perpetrators correctly reckon that if a minor 
crime gets the same punishment as a major one (e.g., 
the death penalty) they may as well go for the larger 
crime with higher expected profits. Once the thresh-
old of three criminal acts is surpassed and given that 
there is a maximum penalty (either life imprisonment 
or death), increasingly serious crimes come at no ad-
ditional cost. Take tax evasion as an example: if even 
minor violations of the tax code are heavily punished, 
it pays to conceal really large amounts. The verdict 
on the effectiveness of the broken window theory is 
open. Some observers are convinced that it is an ef-
fective deterrent, while others are more skeptical (e.g., 
Corman and Mocan, 2005; National Research Coun-
cil, 2004).
2. Punishment does not always work
While punishment is the cornerstone of the Economics 
of Crime, it should be acknowledged that it is sometimes 
inapplicable, inefficient, or even counterproductive.
2.1. Punishment Is Desired by the Perpetrators
There are conditions in which a punishment imposed 
for an illegal act constitutes a benefit, rather than 
a cost, to the perpetrator. Suicidal terrorists who want 
to die are an extreme example.6 Trying to deter them 
even with the threat of capital punishment is useless; 
they want to be heroes or martyrs for their cause. Simi-
larly, gang members want to be punished by the police 
because this is a signal to the other gang members that 
they really belong—the more severe the punishment, 
the clearer the signal. Still, it can be argued that the 
incapacitation effect works, although this applies to the 
perpetrators themselves and has little or no effect on 
others who would like to excel similarly in such illegal 
activities.7 The evidence suggests that in many terror-
ist organizations the supply of people willing to die for 
their cause is abundant (e.g., Krueger, 2008). Eliminat-
ing the top echelon of a terrorist movement or drug 
cartel is ineffective if the demand for the respective 
“services” (i.e., the terrorist cause or the provision of 
drugs) remains unchanged. It simply means that the 
positions are empty thus enabling others to step in.
2.2. Punishment Reduces Legal Opportunities
When an individual has been punished, it is often tak-
en as a signal that the individual is not trustworthy. As 
a result, that individual usually finds it difficult or even 
impossible to find employment in legitimate sectors 
and is induced to turn once again to illegal activities.
2.3. The Maximum Punishment Is Too Low
There are conditions in which the expected punish-
ment for committing a crime is lower than the expected 
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benefits of doing so. If a rational comparison of expected 
benefits and costs indeed guides behavior, this produces 
an incentive to engage in criminal activities. In countries 
observing fundamental human rights, the maximum 
punishment is the death sentence or life imprisonment 
because torture is unacceptable. Civil rights groups have 
argued that putting people to death or keeping them in 
prison for life should be stopped. This position enlarges 
the scope for crime provided that people function ac-
cording to the expected utility calculus.
2.4. Punishment Serves to Educate Criminals
Young criminals often learn the tricks and techniques 
of their trade from more seasoned inmates in prisons. 
Once released, they can engage more productively 
in committing further crimes. This problem is well-
known, but nevertheless endemic.
2.5. Punishing the Innocent
In real life, it is practically impossible to punish all the 
guilty and never punish an innocent person. In many 
cases, innocent people are punished while the guilty 
are not (errors of Type I and II). There is a trade-off: 
the more one tries to catch all violators of the law, the 
more likely it is that one also punishes innocent people. 
The incentive effects may be disastrous. If people real-
ize that they incur a substantial risk of being punished 
even if they follow the law, they have a strong incen-
tive to at least also reap the benefits of acting illegally. 
A pertinent example is tax evasion. If honest people 
end up being punished for nothing, it pays to conceal 
as much as possible and take your chances.
2.6. Unwillingness to Impose the Optimal Pun-
ishment
The Economics of Crime generally assumes that the 
government and the legal system have an interest in 
imposing optimal negative sanctions. This is not nec-
essarily the case. If, for instance, the politicians in 
power undertake unlawful acts or have done so in the 
past, they may find it beneficial to establish suboptimal 
punishments in case their actions are detected. Interest 
groups as well as public opinion may also have a strong 
influence on what punishments are legal and actually 
imposed by judges. Moreover, in many countries, the 
president has the power to reduce or undo a punish-
ment at will. This privilege is often used for politi-
cal and private reasons, even in countries otherwise 
bound to the rule of law.
2.7. Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation
Empirical research has convincingly established that it 
is impossible to account for the extent of tax paying by 
only considering the expected punishment.8 The cru-
cial question is not why people do not pay their taxes, 
but rather “Why is there so little cheating?” (Alm, 
1996; for surveys, see: Torgler, 2007; Andreoni, Erard, 
and Feinstein, 1998.) To some extent, paying one’s tax-
es is a “quasi-voluntary” act (Levi, 1988) attributable 
to an intrinsic motivation to contribute to the burden 
of taxation. Risk aversion is not able to account for the 
extent of taxes paid in the United States and Switzer-
land. The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion would 
have to be no less than 30 in order to account for the 
actual compliance rates, but empirical measures of risk 
aversion lie between 1 and 2; that is, they are substan-
tially lower (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland, 
and Schulze, 1992; Frey and Torgler, 2002). An unfair, 
inconsiderate way of treating taxpayers—punishing 
honest taxpayers by error—tends to undermine this 
tax morale. The net effect of using punishment in an 
effort to establish legal behavior is counterproductive 
if the relative price effect of the punishment is smaller 
than the crowding-out effect. The conditions under 
which this happens have been identified.9
2.8. Unconscious Behavior
There are instances in which people violate the law 
but are not aware of it. As Bazerman, Loewenstein, 
and Moore (2002) argue for the case of accountants 
violating the law, punishing such people has no effect 
because they are not aware of any wrongdoing and are 
therefore unable to correct their behavior.
 These considerations show that punishment, 
while important in many situations, fails under other 
conditions. It is therefore important to seriously con-
sider alternatives to punishment in order to maintain 
a society built on the rule of law.
3. Considering alternatives to punish-
ment
While focusing on punishment as a deterrent, the Eco-
nomics of Crime does not totally neglect other incen-
tives. However, in typical econometric analyses, only 
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a few incentives other than punishment are considered,10 
in particular, the impact of the state of employment 
and education. It has been shown that a reduction in 
unemployment opens new opportunities for individu-
als to find employment in the legitimate as opposed to 
the shadow economy, and this reduces crime. Better-
educated people can more easily earn a good income in 
legal activities and therefore are somewhat immune to 
many kinds of crime.11
The incentives considered by the Economics of 
Crime refer to monetary incentives in the legal as op-
posed to the illegal sector. However, there are other 
incentives to be considered going beyond monetary 
opportunities for people deciding to be active in either 
the legal or the illegal society. It suffices to mention two 
such incentives little considered in the literature.
3.1. Positive Nonmonetary Incentives to Leave 
Crime
An important motivation to give up a life of crime is to 
have an opportunity to reenter the lawful part of soci-
ety without undue costs. In most legal systems, people 
wanting to return to a legitimate activity often are faced 
with extremely high costs or are totally excluded. They 
serve the sentences for their crimes, but the punish-
ment continues after they have served their sentences. 
As a result, they are trapped in the illegitimate sector 
and are forced to continue their activity there. At the 
same time, the people wanting to stay in the illegiti-
mate sector impose heavy barriers to exit because they 
fear that those leaving would be willing to provide the 
police with evidence.
A totally different approach considers the situation 
of people engaged in unlawful activities and seeks to 
raise the benefits of exiting by providing such persons 
with attractive opportunities in the lawful sector: they 
are not punished; instead, they are offered a new iden-
tity and satisfactory employment options so that they 
can start a new life. Such a policy flies in the face of 
what is normally considered fair because past crimes 
are not sanctioned. However, when going beyond the 
primitive urge to punish wrongdoers as a form of ret-
ribution, a policy of positive marginal incentives to 
set aside criminal activities may well turn out to be 
efficient under some conditions. In particular, this is 
the case if such a policy does not induce individuals to 
enter into criminal activity in order to later profit from 
the positive incentives to exit. There is evidence that 
such a situation exists for some gangs, such as the Ma-
fia, and more importantly for terrorist organizations 
(see, extensively, Frey 2004).
3.2. Rewards for Obeying the Law
Instead of punishing people for behaving illegally, per-
sons acting legally can be rewarded in various ways. In-
dividuals and firms can be commended for behaving as 
“good citizens” by handing out orders, medals, prizes, and 
other awards. In the case of taxation, for example, the tax 
authorities can determine which persons and firms have 
cooperated fully with them for an extended period, have 
not made any effort to exploit the law to their advantage, 
and have always paid their tax liabilities on time. Such 
a policy would obviously work only under some condi-
tions because it could become too costly to reward the 
vast majority of people who observe the law. Moreover, 
monetary rewards for obeying social norms may weaken 
the norm and its enforcement and may gradually erode 
norm-guided behavior (Fehr and Falk, 2002).
Nevertheless, such an approach should not be reject-
ed out of hand. As the awards are nonmaterial in form, 
they are not costly, but they may provide substantial 
benefits in terms of reputation and recognition to the 
recipients.12 A major advantage of such a policy is that 
it promotes a positive sum game between the state and 
the citizens, whereas reducing crime by using punish-
ment establishes a negative sum, or antagonistic, game 
resulting in heavy costs for both sides and society as 
a whole. In particular, it has often been observed that 
an antagonistic tax system in which the tax authorities 
mistrust the taxpayers and, in turn, the taxpayers mis-
trust the tax officers produces high costs. In contrast, 
taxing procedures built on a measure of mutual trust 
result in much lower costs and can be considered more 
efficient (Feld and Frey, 2002).
4. Projecting a lawful society
The following considerations are speculative and sug-
gested as possible topics for future research.
The Economics of Crime assumes that human 
preferences are constant and not affected by the en-
vironment. Whether other people violate or obey the 
law does not influence behavior. This assumption has 
proven to be very productive, in particular, because it 
allows us to derive empirically testable propositions.
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 Recent evidence suggests, however, that most peo-
ple’s behavior is influenced by the state of the environ-
ment. More importantly, the broken windows theory can 
be interpreted to show that individuals tend to be more 
inclined to behave illegally if the environment in which 
they act is disorderly.13 In contrast, people are more will-
ing to obey the law if they see that other people also do 
and the general environment is lawful. Such behavioral 
differences are not necessarily due to changes in prefer-
ences, but can be attributed to a changed perception of 
how risky it is to violate the law.
Careful and imaginative field experiments by Keiz-
er, Lindenberg, and Steg (2008) suggest that preference 
changes may be a more appropriate explanation of the 
change in behavior induced by an orderly or disor-
derly environment. They find that increasing norm-
violating behavior negatively affects the conformity to 
other norms. This effect is not limited to social norms, 
but has also been found for police ordinances. It works 
across different activities: if the setting is orderly (e.g., 
the walls are not covered by graffiti), people are induced 
to behave in a law abiding manner also with respect to 
other actions (e.g., they litter less). Consequently, these 
insights with respect to the spread of disorderly behav-
ior have been called the “cross-norm inhibition effect” 
(Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg, 2008: 1682). More gen-
erally, it has been well established that individuals do 
not wish to deviate from the social norms that they 
consider to be prevailing (see, e.g., Messik, 1999; Cial-
dini and Goldstein, 2004).
An immediate policy consequence is that a great ef-
fort is made to keep the environment orderly. Accord-
ing to the broken windows theory, the damage visible by 
illegal behavior, such as damaged buildings, graffiti, or 
litter, must be cleared away as quickly as possible. Such 
a policy only makes sense if the cost of removing the 
damage is not too expensive and if such action does not 
invite potential criminals to do even more damage.
The corrective policy is easy to undertake when the 
damage is immediately visible as is the case with dam-
aged buildings or littering.14 However, in many cases, 
the state of the environment is not directly visible. For 
example, petty crimes (such as stealing handbags) are 
rarely, if ever, directly observed. The same holds even 
more strongly when a person evades taxes. Other 
people cannot directly observe such behavior; an in-
direct indicator at best would be individuals having 
more disposable income than they likely would have if 
they paid their taxes. For that reason, signals become 
important: the government should make an effort to 
project the image that people live in a law abiding so-
ciety. The political decision makers can use “framing” 
in order to shape people’s perceptions about the kind 
of society they live in. It has been shown that individu-
als respond strongly to the way an issue is presented to 
them. If, for instance, a public goods game is labeled 
a “Community Game,” the participants are much more 
willing to act prosocially than when the identical game 
is labeled a “Wall Street Game” (Liberman, Samuels, 
and Ross, 2004).15 It must be emphasized that we are 
not suggesting that the government should provide bi-
ased data on the state of a society. Such a policy would 
not only be morally wrong, but would also risk being 
counterproductive. If the media detects such an at-
tempt, which would likely be the case in an open soci-
ety, people would probably believe that the situation is 
indeed worse than it is in reality.
Consider the case of taxation. If the government 
constantly keeps informing the public that there are 
individuals cheating on their taxes, people start to be-
lieve that cheating on your taxes is an important issue 
and that a large share of the population is involved. 
According to the broken windows theory, this induces 
honest taxpayers to try to cheat on their taxes. This 
may start a downward spiral of ever-increasing tax 
evasion. However, in actuality, only about 5 percent 
of taxpayers are cheaters (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; 
Cowell, 1990). If, on the other hand, the government 
projects the image that most people are honest taxpay-
ers, individuals become aware that they live in a law 
abiding society. This environment provides them with 
the motivation to follow the others and to pay their 
taxes honestly.
The possibility of framing the state of the society 
by the government as a law abiding society depends 
a lot on the media. Following the early insights of Lipp-
mann (1922/2004) that what people know about the 
world around them is mostly the result of secondhand 
knowledge provided by the media (in his time, it was 
newspapers and radio). Thus, people “often respond 
not to events or social trends but to reported events” 
(Page and Shapiro, 1992: 340). More recently, the views 
of the public are strongly influenced by what appears 
during the evening news on television.
Vizja Press&ITwww.ce.vizja.pl
95Punishment – and Beyond
Experimental evidence also suggests that “people 
who were shown network broadcasts edited to draw 
attention to a particular problem assigned greater im-
portance to that problem—greater importance than 
they themselves did before the experiment began, and 
greater importance than did people assigned to control 
conditions that emphasize different problems” (Iyen-
gar and Kinder, 1987: 112). While the news media have 
considerable influence over what and how they report,16 
public affairs news nevertheless is significantly affected 
by governmental agencies. Indeed, it has been argued, 
“in most matters of public policy, the news agenda it-
self is set by those in power” (Bennett, Lawrence, and 
Livingston, 2007: 54; see also Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and 
Shapiro, 2008: 3). While the government cannot sim-
ply project an image of a society obviously at odds with 
what people experience, framing the state of a society 
as law abiding rather than lawless is likely to systemati-
cally affect the behavior of individuals.
5. Overcoming the punishment focus
This paper argues that the Economics of Crime con-
centrates too much on punishment as a way of fighting 
crime. To mainly or even exclusively rely on punishment 
(as a large part of the economic literature implicitly and 
often explicitly does) is unwise for several reasons. An 
important, but generally neglected, reason is that pun-
ishment involves a negative sum game—both the per-
petrators and the honest people loose. Moreover, there 
are important instances in which punishment is unable 
to reduce crime. Relying too much on punishment 
is also unwise because several feasible alternatives to 
punishment exist, such as providing positive incentives 
or handing out awards for law abiding behavior. These 
alternative approaches have the advantage of creating 
a positive sum environment. Yet, another policy to fight 
crime is based on the government framing the image of 
the society. When people are made aware that they live 
in a society, which to a large extent is law-abiding, they 
are motivated to observe the law.
The political economy of these proposals is left for 
future research. It must be taken into account that if 
the government undertakes such “positive” policies, 
in particular, by framing issues to project a law abid-
ing society, the opposition has an incentive to inform 
the public about the extent of crime in that particular 
society. The task is to identify the conditions that de-
termine the resulting political equilibrium. This equi-
librium can be further influenced by the media, which 
is typically prone to emphasizing deviations from 
prevailing social norms—that is, inclined to report or 
even exaggerate criminal activity.
The basic argument of this paper is that it makes sense 
to use the whole spectrum of possibilities to fight crime 
and not to focus only on punishment. I certainly do not 
argue that punishment should never be applied. Howev-
er, one should not ignore the fact that higher clearance 
and conviction rates, while the type (fine, probation, or 
imprisonment) and severity (length of prison sentence 
or amount of fine) of punishment are often small and 
insignificant Entorf and Spengler, 2008, significantly 
deter crime. What is needed is a better, empirically sup-
ported knowledge of the conditions under which the 
various policies are more or less effective. So far, the 
Economics of Crime has only a limited knowledge of 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various 
policies. Hopefully, it will turn out that where one ap-
proach works too little (as pointed out for punishment), 
another approach will work much better. In any case, 
it is time for the Economics of Crime to move beyond 
the strong, and often unique, focus on punishment to 
a broader view of how to contain illegal activities.
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Notes
1  See, for example: Stigler, 1970; Ehrlich, 1973; Polin-
sky and Shavell, 1979; Cameron, 1988; Allen, 1996; 
Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1998; Freeman, 1999; Cor-
man and Mocan, 2000; Eide, 2000; Bourguignon, 
2001; Merlo, 2004; Mocan and Rees, 2005. Recently, 
behavioral or psychologically inspired approaches 
have been used, for example, Garoupa, 2003.
2 It may be argued that such shaming only works for 
one-time offenders, but not for professional crimi-
nals.
3 For the concept of “expressive law,” see Hedman, 
1991; Cooter, 1998; Bohnet and Cooter, 2005.
4 See: Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990; Kel-
ling and Coles, 1996; Gladwell, 2000; Corman and 
Mocan, 2005; Beckenkamp et al., 2009. The concept 
of “broken windows” was inspired by the field ex-
periments undertaken by Zimbardo (1969).
5 Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997; Clark, Austin, and 
Henry, 1997.
6 Not all suicidal terrorists really choose voluntarily 
to die. Often they are manipulated by a terrorist or-
ganization. See: Krueger, 2008; Frey, 2004.
7 One often hears of gang leaders and members con-
tinuing their illegal activities while in jail, for ex-
ample, the American and Sicilian Mafia or the drug 
barons in Columbia (Gambetta, 1993).
8 Torgler, 2001; 2007; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Feld and 
Frey, 2002; 2007; Frey and Torgler, 2007.
9 For theoretical and empirical analyses of motiva-
Vizja Press&ITwww.ce.vizja.pl
99Punishment – and Beyond
tional crowding theory, see: Frey, 1992; Frey, 1997; 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Frey and Jegen, 2001.
10 See the works cited in note 1.
11 However, a better education also makes it easier to 
perpetrate white collar crime.
12 The emerging literature on the Economics of Awards 
more fully discusses and empirically analyzes these 
aspects; see, for example, Frey, 2006, 2007; Necker-
mann and Frey, 2007.
13 This statement has been controversially discussed in 
the literature; see, for example, Skogan 1990; Kel-
ling and Coles, 1996; Kelling and Sousa, 2001; Na-
tional Research Council, 2004.
14 A similar idea has been proposed by Frey and Roh-
ner (2007) as an antiterrorism policy.
15 For more experiments showing the effect of fram-
ing (and of other choice anomalies) on decisions, see 
Hogarth and Reder, 1987; Quattrone and Tversky, 
1988; Dawes and Hastie, 1988; Thaler, 1994; Lin-
denberg and Frey, 1993.
16 For instance, according to the principle of “bad news 
is good news.”
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